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FORECLOSING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
BY PROMPT TENDER OF ECONOMIC LOSS*
Henson Moore** and Jeffrey O'Connell***
As a former student and a current colleague of Wex Malone in the
law of torts, we join in paying tribute to him as one of the great teachers
and scholars in the history of American law.
We believe that a fitting tribute is to take this occasion to discuss
our proposal for reform of the medical malpractice system-a proposal
that builds on Wex's teaching and on his insights into the ever-changing
law of torts.
One of us had the privilege to be a student of Wex. As such he came
to appreciate a man he now calls "the great educator, ruminator, and
interrogator." He believes no one could have been subjected to Wex's
Socratic method of teaching and not have been forever changed. He con-
siders Wex one of his most memorable mentors. He entered into private
practice and on occasion tried medical malpractice cases under the cur-
rent tort law system. He now participates in enacting the laws of the United
States as a member of Congress.
The other of us is a colleague of Wex's in academe, a student of
his learned observations of the tort law, as well as a friend.
Severally we have been touched and guided by Wex. Together we pro-
pose a reform in the medical malpractice system.' We believe the current
malpractice system, based on adversarial contests between healers and pa-
tients to determine and allocate fault, fails to serve the best interests of
patients, those who care for them, and the public at large. Our proposal
is embodied in H.R. 5400, introduced on April 10, 1984.
THE CURRENT SYSTEM
Medical malpractice is adjudicated as torts conventionally have been
over the last 135 years: a victim seeks compensation for loss occasioned
by another's negligence; the award may include not only reimbursement
for the actual monetary loss suffered, but also payment for a variety of
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* The authors wish to acknowledge their debt to John S. Hoff, member of the District
of Columbia Bar, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article and the
proposal embodied herein.
** Member, United States House of Representatives, 6th District, Louisiana; ranking
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States House of Representatives.
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1. We have been brought together by the National Council of Community Hospitals,
an organization of community hospitals devoted to making reforms in the delivery and financ-
ing of health care.
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non-economic injuries, including loss of consortium and pain and suffer-
ing, sometimes augmented by punitive damages supposedly designed to
punish and deter the tortfeasor.2 The determination of fault requires com-
plex and unpredictable litigation which attempts to unravel the largely
unknown mysteries of disease and illness and to determine the ap-
propriateness of treatment procedures about which even the experts are
often bitterly divided. The process is lengthy, and the results are erratic.
Some victims recover nothing. Others receive less than fair compensation.
At the other end of the spectrum, a few plaintiffs recover amounts far
in excess of their actual losses. Large portions of the awards depend on
subjective and emotional considerations. The results are often fortuitous,
and huge transaction costs are required to operate the system.
it is difficult to prove fault in any personal injury case, but the dif-
ficulty of proving whether a driver was driving too fast or under the in-
fluence of chemicals pales in comparison with the task of determining
whether an adverse result in the course of health care resulted from
negligence-and whether the negligent party was the physician, hospital,
drug manufacturer, equipment manufacturer, or any of the multitude of
others who participate in providing care. Jurors may feel comfortable
deciding whether a driver was negligent; this determination is within their
own personal and ordinary experience. But since not many jurors have
had to diagnose disease or perform surgery, the system requires a battle
between phalanxes of expensive expert witnesses. The jury must choose
between two often diametrically opposed views of what the defendant
physician should have done (with the plaintiff's view tailored by hind-
sight). The process is inevitably complex, time-consuming, and expensive;
the result is ineluctably erratic.
The erraticism is further exacerbated by the provision in the current
tort system for payment for non-economic damages, such as loss of con-
sortium and painand suffering, and for punitive damages. These items
represent the "big hit;" yet they are entirely subjective and must be deter-
mined in the discretion of the jury. There is no formula for translating
such non-pectiniary items into pecuniary terms. The plaintiff inevitably
appeals to the jury's sympathy with highly emotional evidence. Recovery
depends on the appearance of the plaintiff as well as on the circumstances
of the plaintiff's life. An attractive young female may receive higher
payments than a working man for the same injury, and disability to a
child is worth more still. The award also increases when the plaintiff is
substantially older, presumably because the elderly, like the very young,
are: seen as vulnerable and therefore excite sympathy when hurt.3
2. For discussions critical of the efficacy of punitive damages-especially for negligent,
as opposed to intentional, injuries, see Symposium, Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1 (1982).
3. O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused. Foreclosure of Personal Injury Claims
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Because of the difficulty of proving causation, those who are injured
by negligence in the health care system do not necessarily recover their
damages. Because of the fortuity and subjectivity involved in the award
of non-economic damages, some plaintiffs are able to recover far more
than their actual damages, while others similarly situated recover less-or
nothing. The results are no more predictable than a lottery.
Another factor increases the windfall nature of recoveries. Damage
awards paid by tortfeasors frequently duplicate amounts paid to the vic-
tims from collateral sources. The victim thus collects twice. In some in-
stances the collateral source recovers the amount paid to the victim by
virtue of subrogation, but to the extent that subrogation is effective, the
use of insurance premiums has been inefficient since the same event has
been covered by two different carriers, one insuring the tortfeasor and
the other paying the victim' (although premiums should be lowered to
reflect the possibility of subrogation, it is not apparent that this adjust-
ment actually occurs).
The tort system does not, therefore, fulfill the purpose it presumably
was intended to serve. It does not provide a fair and rational method
for compensating victims of medical malpractice. And yet society pays
high costs for operating this unsatisfactory lottery.
The process requires patients and providers in many cases, particularly
where there has arguably been negligence, to assume stances diametrically
opposed to what they want. A patient must accuse those who have cared
for him and whom he may need to continue to care for him. The pro-
viders must deny culpability for an outcome they believe they may be
responsible for.
The relationship between hospital and physician is poisoned as each
(typically through separate insurance companies) points the finger of fault
at the other. Their ability to provide care is disrupted by the need to
prepare a defense. Physicians who are sued even though they believed
they did their best often become depressed and suffer diminished
productivity.' Malpractice awards increase insurance premiums, causing
by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U. L. REV.
589, 592 (1982).
4. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Contributory and Comparative Fault, with Com-
pensatory Savings by Also Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 591,
604-05.
5. A report by the Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association finds that
"the biggest cost" of suits brought under the malpractice system is "the emotional injury
that a physician experiences when he or she believes that he or she has done the best possi-
ble under difficult circumstances. Decreases in physician productivity as a result of such
dysfunction cannot be estimated." Report, Board of Trustees [American Medical Associa-
tion], Study of Professional Liability Costs (Substitute Resolution 8, A-82) Report: N(I-83)
p. 15 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Report].
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physicians to raise their fees. Risk of suit causes physicians to decline
to undertake the more difficult procedures, and sometimes to retire. The
fear of malpractice forces doctors to practice defensive medicine, pro-
viding more tests and procedures than they otherwise would, and thus
subjecting patients to unnecessary services and raising the costs of health
care to all Americans. A recent report by the Board of Trustees of the
American Medical Association estimates that defensive medicine consumes
in excess of $15 billion annually in physician costs.'
Attorneys' fees consume large amounts of money that would other-
wise be available for victims. Defendants and their insurance companies
must pay in every case, while plaintiffs who win must yield a large percen-
tage of their recovery in the form of contingent fees. It is estimated that
the medical malpractice tort system returns at most only twenty-eight cents
of the premium dollar to injured patients, of which only 12.5 cents reim-
burses the victim for pecuniary losses not compensated by other sources.7
No one benefits from the present malpractice system other than the
lawyers and expert witnesses who thrive upon it.
The present system is particularly unresponsive to the needs of
Medicare beneficiaries. They file malpractice claims at a rate roughly one-
fourth of the rate at which patients under sixty-five years of age do.'
The fact that earning capacity, and thus the potential recovery for
economic loss, declines for most persons over age sixty-five partially ex-
plains this discrepancy. There are other factors as well. Medicare
beneficiaries are less likely to want to become involved in the judicial
system. They are less willing to engage in an adversarial dispute with the
physician who is treating them; they perceive a more immediate and con-
tinuing need for his care, and they fear they may not be able to find
another physician. Their shorter life expectancy does not permit them the
luxury of waiting for the outcome of years of litigation.' Medicare
beneficiaries in particular would be better served by a system that pro-
vides them more assurance of fair compensation, quickly recognized, for
their real losses rather than the hope (often little more than the will-o'-
the-wisp) of a windfall recovery after years of bitter litigation.
THE TORT SYSTEM IN CHANGING CONDITIONS
This country has recently begun a fundamental reevaluation of how
it determines the use and allocation of economic resources as it comes
6. Id. at 14.
7. O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance
for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 509 (1976).
8. P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 26
(1982).
9. It has recently been estimated that "it takes an average of seven years to adjudicate
a malpractice claim." J. Commerce, Jan. 16, 1984, at 9C, cols. 4-5.
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to recognize that these resources are not as limitless as decision-makers
since World War II had assumed. Health care is an important compo-
nent of this reevaluation. Policymakers are beginning to realize that new
methods must be developed to finance and deliver health care more effi-
ciently and more innovatively. We believe a proposal to provide a less
wasteful and more just means for compensating people for injuries caused
by the health care system would be an important part of this reform ef-
fort. We must not assume that the present system is inevitable or im-
mutable. We can reshape the tort system so that it better serves society.
The shape of the tort system has varied over the years as the needs
of the times have changed. For instance, Wex has explained in a learned
piece published in an earlier volume of the Louisiana Law Review, what
might seem, at first blush, an irony: the contraction from absolute liabil-
ity to fault in the English common law accompanied the economic expan-
sion of England in the nineteenth century.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the liberality toward
the defendant's predicament in [early] . . . traffic cases [under
absolute liability] was an outgrowth of the practical dilemma for
litigation that was shaping up as the roads of nineteenth century
England were gradually improved. Courts were faced with the fact
that there was a pressing interest in the full utilization of the
highways, and that decisions mechanically rendered in favor of
victims under the Trespass [or absolute liability] theory would have
a serious adverse effect on highway users. An impressive group
interest in travel had emerged and courts were impelled to take
it into account. Hence the plaintiff, if he were to recover, must
make a presentation with greater appeal than a mere showing that
his injury was "directly" inflicted. It became apparent that under
the strict Trespass action, no traveler could afford to risk his for-
tune by making use of the highways. Thus the idea of negligence
emerged as an inviting compromise in these cases: 1tL the driver
do all that he can to avoid a mishap, and if an accident never-
theless occurs, he will not be held responsible. In this way each
traveler received some-but not complete-protection, and all were
afforded an opportunity to avoid liability by so conducting
themselves as to reduce the accident risk to a minimum.' 0
From mid-century onward the trend toward the fault require-
ment became precipitous. There was emerging a new industrial
society made up of men who ventured their capital on the mass
fabrication of goods in mechanized establishments and who
10. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law
of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1970) (footnote omitted).
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transported their products throughout the nation on fast moving
steam railways. Society was fast migrating to the urban centers.
There was wealth to be had and wages to be earned-but all at
high risks in terms of safety. The new society in its dangerous
world was viewed by the courts as one that was willing to com-
promise safety for economic advantage; and negligence afforded
the means whereby concessions could be made. A live-and-let-
live postulate which was first manifest in the early traffic cases
had eventually become the attitude adopted by an entire nation.
Indeed, the pendulum of change had made its full swing before
the century expired and the courts found themselves pressed to
withhold liability for harm inflicted by the industry and transpor-
tation enterprises even where fault was obvious. Immunities,
sharply limited duties, and elaborate defenses were urged upon
the courts, and often with considerable success.''
So, as Wex tells us, the law started with absolute liability (really a
form of no-fault) and turned to fault-based liability as a way of limiting
liability. Indeed, Wex went on to indicate that liability based on fault
may now be outmoded-and that we must not be rigid in our thinking
because of the law's past reliance on fault-based liability.
As the concept of tort liability gradually emerged from its
medieval chrysalis and became nascent in English history it af-
forded little indication that the existence or nonexistence of defen-
dant's blameworthiness was a matter of much concern to the law.
This held not only for the early Anglo-Saxon proceeding, but for
its eventual successor, the suit in Trespass, and even for the later
developed action of Trespass on the Case. The suit in Case,
however, did introduce the notions of duty and neglect which were
destined to serve as the bases for the eventual appearance of the
negligence requirement in the traffic cases later in the nineteenth
century.
In referring to the history of negligence prior to the nineteenth
century Professor Winfield observed that "It is a skein of threads,
most of which are fairly distinct, and no matter where we cut
the skein we shall get little more than a bundle of frayed ends."
Indeed, this same observation can be made concerning the fault
picture throughout the nineteenth century and even up to the pre-
sent day in England. We are likely to gain a deeper insight into
the significance of fault (or the lack of it) by fixing our attention
upon the particular type of human activity involved and upon
11. Id. at 40-41.
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the economic and social demands of the time and place than we
can gain by paying reverence to the language of the judges as
they have undertaken to serve as spokesmen for their own
society. I I
We believe that at this "time and place" the tort system is not ade-
quately serving those who are involved in the "human activity" of health
care, and that the application of fault should be modified. Our thesis
is that in medical malpractice some modifications of fault-based liability
are now necessary to provide a fairer and more efficient means of com-
pensating more victims for injury.
Periodically the tort system has-been modified to provide a more ef-
ficient and fair system and to correlate more accurately the injury and
the need for compensation. One of the first efforts out of the vicious
cycle of the tort system was the workers' compensation laws originally
enacted in Germany in the late nineteenth century and adopted in this
country early in the twentieth century. Workers injured on the job had
been required to prove the fault, of their employers. Concerned employers
in the United States recognized that this burden required huge transac-
tion costs and was an inefficient method of paying needed compensation.
They were instrumental in persuading lawmakers to institute a new system
providing. for payment without fault for injury arising out of employ-
ment. This system eliminated arguments over fault in industrial accidents
and paid injured workers on the basis of their economic loss.
More recently, no-fault automobile insurance has been developed to
mitigate the tort system in another area. Each party to an accident is
paid regardless of who is at fault; in exchange, each party is compen-
sated only for his net economic loss, and correspondingly he waives his
tort action against the other.'"
Various surveys have demonstrated that no-fault automobile insurance
when properly structured permits a smaller percentage of the premium
dollar to be spent on legal fees and other transaction costs, compensates
more injured victims, and pays claims more promptly. Dollars formerly
used to pay non-pecuniary losses are used to pay more pecuniary losses.' 4
It appears the success in automobile no-fault has had a spillover ef-
fect in the medical malpractice and products liability area. These claims
12. Id. at 43-44 (footnote omitted) (quoting Winfield, The History of Negligence in
the Law of Torts, 42 LAW Q. REV. 184, 185 (1926)).
13. For.a discussion of no-fault auto insurance laws and their operation, see O'Con-
nell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56 NEB. L. REv. 23
(1977); O'Connell & Beck, An Update of the Surveys on the Operation of No-Fault Auto
Laws, 1979 INS. L.J. 129; see also Williams, Insurance Hassle: No-Fault Auto Policies Are
Widely Attacked as Costly, Ineffective, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
14. See authorities cited supra note 13.
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now comprise a much greater portion of personal injury claims than before
the advent of automobile no-fault. Lawyers finding one market
diminished-or at least threatened-may have entered into the other."
According to one source, fifty percent of the responding attorneys stated
that they saw little or no evidence of malpractice in more than half the
cases they took.'"
A recent survey conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the
All-Industry Research Advisory Council asked respondents to choose from
a list of eleven possible reasons for the increase in malpractice lawsuits.
Their responses (in percent) were the following:
People are more aware that they can sue 63
People want to make money on lawsuits 55
Doctors do unnecessary operations 53
Lawyers encourage lawsuits to make money 52
Publicity about big awards encourages more lawsuits 48
Lawyers are more willing to sue doctors today 39
Doctors get careless 37
People expect doctors not ever to make mistakes 36
Doctors charge too much 28
Doctors see too many patients 22
Hospitals are understaffed 20'
Medical malpractice claims are increasing, as are judgments and costs.
Premiums are increasing and insurance companies are pulling out of the
market. We seem to be approaching another malpractice crisis like the
one between 1974 and 1975.'
15. J. O'Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery: Only the Lawyers Win 172-73 (1979) (adapted
from O'Connell, supra note 13 at 44:45). A recent study suggests, however, that the in-
troduction of no-fault does not affect the frequency of medical malpractice claims, but
may increase the amount of each claim (a result the author believes may be spurious). P.
DANZON, supra note 8, at 29. As Danzon points out, the full effect of the introduction
of no-fault automobile insurance has not been experienced because in most instances the
thresholds at which tort actions could be brought were set too low.
16. Van Scoy-Mosher, An Rx for the Malpractice Explosion, L.A. Times, June 28,
1983, reviewing D. Flaster, Malpractice: A Guide to the Legal Rights of Patients and Doc-
tors (1983).
17. All-[Insurance] Industry Research Advisory Council (AIRAC), Public Attitude
Monitor 1983: A Public Attitude Survey on Drunk Driving, Medical Malpractice, Seatbelts,
and Other Insurance and Safety-Related Topics 24 (Oct. 1983). For a searching analysis
of various putative causes of the rise in medical malpractice litigation, see Robinson, Medical
Malpractice: Thoughts Out of Season, nn. 37-93 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Robinson,
Thoughts] to be published in two parts in somewhat altered form in 1985 NAT'L J. LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
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Ten years ago, a rapid and dramatic expansion in recoveries caused
a number of insurers to withdraw from the market. Those which remained
raised their rates. One consequence was the organization by physicians
and hospitals of their own captive insurance companies. The states re-
sponded with a number of "reforms," such as providing for voluntary
arbitration, modifying or affecting the collateral source rule which
prevented juries from considering plaintiffs' other sources of money, in-
troducing screening panels, tightening statutes of limitation, and limiting
the size of contingency fees.' 8 A recent study of the effect of these reforms
found, on the. basis of data through 1978, that the increase in the fre-
quency of claims leveled off after 1976. It questioned, however, whether
this was the result of these tort reforms, since the deceleration trend was
not confined to medical malpractice and was observed in the tort system
more generally.' 9 Furthermore, even while the frequency of claims was
leveling off, the study found the severity per patient claim increased between
1975 and 1978 by an average annual rate of roughly thirty percent. It found
no effect on severity of claims from most of the reforms, but it did find an
effect from those laws which placed a cap on recoveries and which mandated
the offset of compensation from collateral sources.2"
The reforms, therefore, at best had an isolated and limited effect
through 1978. As suggested above, more recent experience indicates that
another malpractice crisis is imminent. Awards and settlements are in-
creasing. Data collected by the Socioeconomic Monitoring System of the
American Medical Association in July and August of 1983 revealed that
the average incidence of claims per 100 physicians increased from 3.3 to
8.0 in the period from 1978 to 1983.2 Between 1978 and 1981 the number
of jury awards in excess of $1 million increased from thirteen to forty-
five. For awards less than $1 million, the average award per claim in-
creased from $174,400 to $251,500.22 Malpractice premiums, it is estimated,
will increase 20-30% this year, "with no relief in sight in the near
future."2 3
Data derived by the AMA's Socioeconomic Monitoring System in 1983
show that physicians have responded to premium increases by various ac-
18. P. DANZON, supra note 8, at 39-48, app. A. For an extensive discussion of the
reforms, see Robinson, Thoughts, supra note 17.
19. P. DANZON, supra note 8, at 2, 29.
20. Id. at 30. For a further discussion fo the effects of the reforms, see Robinson,
Thoughts, supra note 17.
21. Report, supra note 5, at 6.
22. Lavin, Malpractice, A New Storm is Looming, Med. Econ., Oct. 3, 1983 at 83;
see also P. Carlin, Medical Malpractice Pre-Trial Screening Panels: A Review of the Evidence,
(Intergovernmental Health Policy Project, Geo. Wash. U.) 6-7 (1980); Curran, Medical
Malpractice Claims Since the Crisis of 1975: Some Good News and Some Bad, 309 NEw
ENG. J. OF MED. 1107 (1983).
23. Bus. Ins., Sept. 26, 1983, at 1.
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tions, the most frequent of which were: maintaining more detailed pa-
tient records (56.7%); referring more cases to other physicians (44.80o);
prescribing additional diagnostic tests (40.800);21 spending more time with
patients (35.9%); not accepting certain types of cases (34.67o); and in-
creasing fees (31.40o).2"
A recent survey of obstetricians/gynecologists reveals similar results.
More than 76% of those surveyed said that they have increased their testing
and other diagnostic procedures in response to the threat of malpractice
suits.2 6 Liability insurance was said to be the most important factor (ex-
ceeding even inflation by a small margin) in the decision to make fee
increases,2" and more than 74% (in excess of 90076 in Florida and New
York) reported that the increase in the cost of malpractice insurance had
directly affected their professional fees.2" Thirty-two percent restricted their
practice because of the threat: for example, they decreased the amount
of high-risk procedures they perform, or eliminated their obstetrical
practice. 29
Admittedly we cannot be sure of the effects, if any, of such actions
on the quality of health care. But they do seem to substantially increase
health care costs by causing physicians to practice defensive medicine.3"
By definition, physicians are taking these defensive steps not because they
believe there is a medical justification for them but because they perceive
inappropriate pressure from the tort system. A revival of the malpractice
crisis will further accentuate these trends and further raise health care costs.
At the same time, injured patients are not being adequately served.
A study of patient outcomes performed in 1974 under the joint sponsor-
ship of the California Medical Association and the California Hospital
Association found potentially compensable events (disabilities caused by
health care providers) in 4.65% of hospital admissions, but concluded
that only 0.79076 of admissions could probably result in payment based
on fault. 3 Thus, if this study is correct, patients might be expected to
recover, at the most, in only 17% of potential hospital injury cases.
24. In addition, 27.207o reported providing additional treatment procedures. Report,
supra note 5, at table 3.
25. Id.
26. See Porter, Novelli & Assocs., Professional Liability Insurance and Its Effects: Report
of a Survey of ACOG's [American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists] Membership
Table 22 (1983).
27. Id. at Table 20.
28. Id. at Table 26.
29. Id. at Table 22.
30. For an argument that the adverse effects of defensive medicine on the quality of
health care, adduced by fear of malpractice liability, have not been proven, see Robinson,
Thoughts, supra note 17. On the general subject of deterrence, see authorities cited infra
notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
31. Summary Highlights, Medical Insurance Feasibility Study (Calif. Med. Assoc. and
1276 [Vol. 44
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No NO-FAULT MALPRACTICE
Medical malpractice might therefore appear an appropriate area for
application of the no-fault concept. However, there are substantial reasons
for not doing so. Chief among these is the difficulty of determining when
a compensable event occurs or, stated differently, what events should be
compensated.
We can say with some degree of certainty that an automobile acci-
dent occurs because the drivers were driving on the road and not because
of some other pre-existing or extrinsic cause (with exceptions for cases
in which a driver has a heart attack, a tree falls on the road, or a typhoon
sweeps a car away). One can under most ,circumstances expect to navigate
the streets safely, and if that expectation is not achieved, it is almost in-
variably the result of an event which occurs on the road. Accordingly,
the no-fault automobile insurance system typically compensates a motorist
for injuries "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle," and need not further differentiate among accidents that will be
covered., 2
In medical care, however, it is far less clear whether the lack of suc-
cess from medical treatment is the result of improper medical care or
merely from the natural workings of disease. Disease and death are in-
evitable. Society could in theory introduce a no-fault insurance plan pro-
viding for the payment of benefits if treatment is not successful. This
plan would be the conceptual analogue of automobile no-fault insurance:
payment for an untoward event occurring in the course of a specified
activity. But because death is inevitable and because the treatment of
disease is only to a moderate extent within the control of man, such a
plan essentially would be a national life, health and disability insurance
program. It would pay benefits regardless of fault for every death and
even for all morbidity occurring in the course of medical treatment. This
result would be not unlike New Zealand's national accident insurance
scheme, which pays unlimited medical expenses and limited wage losses
resulting from accidental injury.33
But to introduce such a scheme for all health care would represent
a massive shift of resources. It could not be financed privately, but would
Calif. Hosp. Assoc., Aug. 1977). For other estimates showing similar disparity between
potentially compensable adjustments and claims made, see Robinson, Thoughts supra note 17.
32. As to problems of legal causation under a no-fault law, see J. O'Connell & R.
Henderson, Tort Law, No-Fault and Beyond 362-65 (1975). That a tortfeasor other than
a motorist has contributed to the accident does not relieve the motorist and his no-fault
insurer from paying no-fault benefits, but tort actions by the accident victim and in subroga-
tion by the automobile no-fault insurer are permitted against the third-party tortfeasor, as
is also true against a third-party tortfeasor under workers' compensation. Id. at 372-402.
33. Accident Compensation Act, No. 43, 1 N.Z. Stat. 521 (1972); see Palmer, Acci-
dent Compensation in New Zealand, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1977).
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require the government's taxing and redistribution powers. It would
substitute government intrusion for private and individual decision-making.
It seems, in any event, financially unfeasible. Such a plan of medical no-
fault thus seems not within the realm of practicality or desirability.
NEEDED REFORMS TO MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
In health care, therefore, the tort system based on fault cannot be
abandoned.14 But the current tort system can still be modified to encourage
payment for more patients who suffer from adverse results of treatment,
in an amount which fairly reflects their need and which reduces the time
and transaction costs of making that payment. Our proposal would
strongly encourage-but not require-the payment of compensation to
malpractice victims promptly and without litigation; hence the title of this
article: "Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of
Economic Loss." It would use money which now is expended in transac-
tion costs, in fortuitous payment of non-economic damages and in
duplicate payment from collateral sources to some plaintiffs, to provide
meaningful compensation to more victims, more quickly."
The malpractice system is a matter of state law. At the same time,
the federal government has a special role in health care; it assists in the
financing of health care for millions of Americans: beneficiaries of
Medicare and Medicaid, veterans, armed forces personnel and their
families, and its own employees. The federal government annually expends
many billions of dollars to provide health care for these people. The cur-
rent tort system provides an unsatisfactory form of redress for these
beneficiaries. At the same time it raises the cost of health care provided
to them, and thus the amount the federal government must expend to
provide assistance.
Our proposal therefore attempts to balance the states' responsibility
for determining the shape of their tort systems with the federal govern-
ment's need for change. It sets forth what we believe are needed reforms
in the medical malpractice system. And it provides that these reforms will
apply to care provided to beneficiaries of the federal health programs after
January 1, 1987, unless the state in which the beneficiaries reside has
enacted its own law like that proposed for the federal beneficiaries but
34. For the proposition that at least some injuries in the course of medical treatment
can be based on no-fault criteria, see O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability:
Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. Rv. 501, 523-28 (1976).
35. For the justification for changing the compensation system to afford lesser payments,
consisting of the victim's real economic losses, to more accident victims, compared with
present tort payouts of more payment, including coverage for non-economic losses, to fewer
victims, see O'Connell, supra note 3, at 612-13. For a discussion that damages for pain
and suffering violate insurance doctrine, economic theory and administrative efficiency, see
O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in Return
for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333-48, 366-68.
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applicable to all health care provided in the state. Thus, if the states enact
their own reforms for all health care, the federal government will not
need to act on its own. But if a state does not do so before January
1, 1987, the federal legislation will take effect and govern medical malprac-
tice occurrences suffered by federal beneficiaries.
The terms of our proposal can be outlined briefly.16
The law would encourage hospitals and physicians to compensate the
patient for his net economic loss suffered because of adverse results from
treatment. This loss would consist mainly of the costs incurred for fur-
ther medical and hospital care, for rehabilitation and nursing care, for
lost wages, for the costs of obtaining a housekeeper, and for adapting
the patient's house and car to his incapacitated condition. The law would
provide that if a hospital, physician, or other health care provider tenders
an offer to pay periodically this amount within the required time, the
patient's ability to bring an action in tort would be superseded (with cer-
tain exceptions discussed below). In exchange for the agreement to pay
for economic loss, the patient would relinquish the ability to sue for non-
economic loss. If the physician or hospital did not make an offer within
the required time, or if the injured patient believed that one of the excep-
tions applied and rejected the tender, he could bring a tort action as under
present law.
Hospitals and physicians often feel uncomfortable and indeed believe
that they are acting contrary to their caring mission when they deny that
any harm occurred to a patient, or that they were responsible for it. They
are deterred from making the admission by requirements of insurance com-
panies, by fear of adverse publicity, and, most importantly, by fear of
the huge judgments that can result under the present system from an ad-
mission of culpability. Our proposal would encourage the provider to act
consistently with its humanitarian purpose. It would give hospitals and
physicians and other health care providers positive incentives to identify
and disclose events which could give rise to malpractice actions and to
make a prompt offer to pay for losses from those adverse medical results.
The provider would be able to foreclose a tort action only if it made
the required offer within 180 days of the patient's discharge from an in-
stitution or, if the event did not occur in the course of an admission,
within 180 days of the event giving rise to the possible malpractice claim.
Under the bill, the provider would not await a claim; it would be re-
quired to make the offer within the required time regardless of whether
a claim was made. This will provide meaningful incentives for providers
to ascertain potentially actionable occurrences and to inform the patient
thereof."
36. The statute is an outgrowth of the ideas expounded in O'Connell, supra note 3.
37. The statute could be drafted such that the tender could be triggered primarily by
a tort claim rather than by defendant's discovery of the injury. That would be especially
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Once a provider has made a commitment to pay the victim's economic
loss, it is required within thirty days to make payments for any losses
already incurred and to continue to make them as further losses are
incurred.
The legislation thus contemplates that payments be made as loss ac-
crues. It provides, however, that, if the parties agree, and a court ap-
proves, a lump sum payment may be made to the victim. (The legislation
authorizes the court to make provisions to prevent dissipation of the fund.)
Any amount which the victim would be entitled to receive from collateral
sources would be netted against the' amount the provider would be
obligated to pay.
The bill also permits the provider and the patient to agree that the
provider may discharge its liability by a tender of less than full economic
loss. It is unwise, and probably impossible, to prevent people from mak-
ing their own arrangements. However, to avoid the risk that an
unscrupulous provider or its insurance company might take undue advan-
tage of an injured patient any settlement for payment of less than full
economic loss (if the economic loss exceeds $5000) would have to be ap-
proved by the court to be effective. If such a lesser settlement were re-
quired to be submitted to a court, but was not submitted, the settlement
would not be effective, and the patient would have the same rights as
any victim of malpractice to whom a tender is not made.
The injured patient is assured by the provider's tender that he will
be made financially whole for the injury without having to bring suit and
suffer the uncertainity and delay of litigation. In exchange for this cer-
tainty, and the inducements to the provider to make the tender, the pa-
tient gives up an opportunity to participate in the litigation lottery, which
admittedly for some victims results in recovery for non-economic damages.
Under the present system attorneys' fees owed by a prevailing.plain-
tiff are often paid out of the non-economic damages; that extra payment
thus funds the payment of contingent fees.38 Because these elements of
damages would be eliminated, the bill provides that, in addition to pay-
ing the patient's net economic loss, the tendering provider would pay
reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the victim in
obtaining legal advice about the tender and collecting benefits.
The bill provides that either the physician or a hospital or other
provider39 which believes it is at risk of liability for an event may make
more sensible for a bill allowing tenders to foreclose tort claims by other than health care
providers (such as those facing, for example, products liability generally or occupiers' liability
for slips and falls, where the injurer is less likely than a health care provider to know
of the injury in the absence of a claim). See O'Connell, supra note 3, at 601, 615-17, 624-26.
38. O'Connell, supra note 35, at 351.
39. The bill includes as providers not only hospitals but also skilled nursing facilities,
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the offer to the injured patient. The provider making such a tender may
also designate any third person who may be liable as a participant in
the tender. The issue of whether or in what amount a third person must
contribute to the amount to be tendered would be determined in a separate
proceeding." A third person so designated would receive the same pro-
tection against tort suits as a tendering provider. Although a third person
thus can be forced to participate in the tendering process against his will,
he will not, as a practical matter, be disadvantaged by being a participant
in a tender: He thereby avoids exposure to liability for non-economic tort
damages (including pain and suffering), and can still deny and dispute
any liability on his part under the tender."' Thus if a hospital makes a
tender, it may designate a physician as a co-tenderer. A physician may
similarly designate the hospital. Either tenderer may also designate a drug
or equipment manufacturer or other person who may be liable. A third
party who is a non health care provider may also require the physician
or hospital making a tender to inclide such party within the tender, but
the third party may not require a health care provider to make a tender."'
When a tender is made and more than one person is designated as
a participant in it, the participants may agree upon their relative con-
tribution to the compensation to be paid to the victim. It can be expected
that this agreement will be made informally and expeditiously among in-
surance companies and other organizations which know they will be deal-
ing with each other on an on-going basis, and, consequently, that they
will make common-sense settlements. If they fail to do so, however, this
question will be submitted to arbitration to be decided on the basis of
relative fault among the participants in the tender. 3
In this way, the victim is protected from evasive finger-pointing among
the various parties who may be liable, and by the same token, cannot
play one off against the other. The patient receives compensation. The
participants are obligated to pay that compensation, and their insurers
determine their respective shares of. it.
The bill would not permit the provider to preclude a tort action in
home health agencies, rural health clinics, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities,
and hospice programs.
Note the bill does not change current practices as to whether an insurer must obtain
approval from the insured health care provider of the former's decisions relating to settlement.
40. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
41. Id.
42. The bill permits only a provider to make the tender, although third parties could
participate in any tender made. These third persons are not, in most instances, in direct
contact with the patient as are the hospital and the physician, and the patient looks to
the hospital and the physician to provide the care. The decision whether to make a tender
is most appropriately left to them.
43. At common law, any defendant could implead any third person in a tort action;
thus, involving such third person in the tender can be viewed as a form of impleading.
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two categories: where a wrongful death action could be brought and where
the provider's malpractice was intentional."' If the victim elected to rely
on the exception for intentional malpractice, he would notify the hospital
or physician making a tender that he was rejecting that tender. Thus the
patient could not receive payment for economic loss and then sue in tort,
alleging that the exception applied.
It may be necessary to add a third exception, but we have not done
so in the bill because of concern that such an exception would be ex-
panded to provide too broad a loophole for arguably sympathetic cases.
The issue is how to treat injuries which are grievous but which result
in little or no economic loss. Is the injured patient fairly compensated
in such a case by payment of economic loss? Should the patient have
the option to resort to conventional tort actions? Can a standard be im-
posed that would give courts discretion to permit conventional tort ac-
tions in some cases, without creating a loophole for too many cases?
If society believes foreclosure of tort actions is unconscionable where
the victim would receive a small recovery for a severe injury, it might
be possible to include a provision that permits a judge to allow the
foreclosure of a tort action to be overridden in exceptional circumstances.
Such a standard might be found in the doctrine of current tort law relating
to proof of fraud of settlements voluntarily made. The standard could
be that when a court, as a matter of law, would have found the payment
of compensation benefits plus amounts payable by collateral sources, if
it had been a voluntary settlement, so inadequate as to allow the settle-
ment to be set aside, 5 the court should not permit foreclosure of the
tort action by virtue of a tender.
Rarely are victims of misfortune, whether injury,, crime, unemploy-
44. The definition of intentional is as follows:
A person intentionally causes or attempts to cause a personal injury when the
person acts or fails to act for the purpose of causing injury or with knowledge
that injury is substantially certain to follow; but a person does not intentionally
cause or attempt to cause injury merely because the individual's act or failure
to act is intentional or is done with the individual's realization only that it creates
a grave risk of causing injury without the purpose of causing injury or if the
act or omission is for the purpose of averting bodily harm to the individual or
another person.
For the necessity of thus rigidly defining intentional conduct as opposed to including
gross negligence, see J. O'Connell, Ending Insult to Injury: No-Fault Insurance for Pro-
ducts and Services 154-55 (1975); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 34, at
186-87 (4th ed. 1971).
45.
Although mere inadequacy of consideration is not sufficient of itself to set aside
a release [at common law], it is a factor to be considered along with other evidence
to determine the existence of fraud; however, if the consideration is so grossly
and palpably inadequate as to shock one's moral sense, it alone is sufficient to
bring the question of fraud to the jury.
3B Personal Injury: Actions, Defenses, Damages § 4.01[I][al at Dis-147-48 (L. Frumer
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ment, underemployment, etc., guaranteed prompt payment of all-or even
the great bulk-of their pecuniary losses. The program we propose will
provide more compensation for pecuniary loss, more promptly paid, and
for more victims of medical malpractice with far fewer transaction costs
than the present system. The theory behind the legislation, then, is that
society should determine that prompt payment to a victim of all his
pecuniary loss is a fair disposition of medical malpractice cases, given
all the expense, delay, and uncertainty in establishing liability. In this con-
nection, even for the white collar worker who suffers an amputation, an
injury which may result in little or no economic loss to him, the guarantee
of all losses, including rehabilitation, plus psychiatric and other counsel-
ing, would seem to provide fair compensation.
Since the bill permits the tortfeasor to foreclose actions for non-
economic damages, there is a danger of adverse selection. The concern
is that providers will make tenders only in those cases in which their con-
duct has been most faulty and in which it is most likely that a tort action
would result in a large judgment, and conversely, that they will not make
a tender in the marginal cases in which they do not perceive a substantial
risk of liability. But the premise of the proposal is that society is better
off if even the clearly faulty (but not intentional) tortfeasor is not re-
quired to pay a large judgment for non-economic damages after lengthy
and expensive litigation, so that victims may be provided fair compensa-
tion for economic loss quickly and without expensive and bitter litigation.
Even when liability is doubtful, the health care provider will have
an incentive to tender the patient's net economic loss whenever the pro-
vider's litigation costs will exceed the patient's net economic loss. The
large litigation expenses common in malpractice cases" will thereby en-
courage the health care provider to pay patients' net economic losses rather
than defense lawyers-arguably a much more socially beneficial use of
precious insurance dollars.
The provider also may well be likely to settle for the injured patient's
net economic loss when it faces possible liability for large amounts in
excess of economic loss, whether in the form of an award for pain and
suffering or in the form of punitive damages."7 The proposed system pro-
vides a safety valve. The defendants cannot require such a settlement (1)
if the provider has intentionally inflicted injury, or (2) the injury results
in death. As to all other cases, both large and small, it makes sense for
society to encourage elimination of expensive legal disputes. Especially
is this so in that payment for pain and suffering is expensive to determine"8
ed. 1980). For alternate but similar-if less restrictive-tests, see O'Connell, supra note 3,
at 601-02.
46. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 590-91.
47. As to the latter, see supra note 2.
48. Id. at 491-92.
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and counter-productive compared to using insurance dollars to pay for
dollars lost.
4 9
The health care provider will also have an incentive to settle for the
patient's net economic loss regardless of the provider's doubtful liability
whenever the injured patient's collateral sources cover most of his special
damages. This too makes economic sense given the waste of either double
payment to the patient or of subrogation to a liability claim by a loss
insurer." Rather than promote such waste, it is far better to permit the
health care provider, in effect, to use the amount of an injured patient's
collateral sources, either alone or in combination with amounts otherwise
spent on counsel fees and pain and suffering, to pay for a patient's other-
wise unreimbursed losses, thus allowing the parties-and society-to be
rid of the claim with such payment of the patient's essential losses.".
WHY REQUIRE SETTLEMENT?
Nothing prevents the hospital or the physician under present law from
settling a claim with a patient. Our proposal would give the provider the
option of requiring the patient to forego the tort action in exchange for
a promise to pay his net economic losses. The provider thus would have
the ability to impose a settlement. Is that result fair and proper? We believe
that it is, because it would encourage more settlements for more victims
than is possible under the current system. The deficiencies of the present
49. See authorities cited supra note 35.
50. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 593.
51. In view, however, of the risk of adverse selection by the health care provider, another
provision might be added to advantage the victim of an adverse medical result who has
not been tendered his net economic loss and yet does not wish to undergo the delay of
tort litigation; thus, when the 180 day period within which a tender must be paid has ex-
pired, and thereafter a patient makes a malpractice claim, the health care provider will
be obligated to offer the patient the option, in addition to a regular malpractice claim,
of arbitrating within 90 days of the claim claimant's right, based on proof of the health
care provider's negligence, to receive the benefits due under a tender, namely, net economic
loss, payable periodically, plus reasonable counsel fees if the claim is successful. (Note pay-
ment of counsel fees by the health care provider, in addition to net economic loss, is re-
quired to reimburse the victim's economic loss, assuming no payment for pain and suffer-
ing. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.) Thus, the patient not tendered net economic
loss who would prefer a quick, less formal adjudication of his allegation of malpractice,
payable only for net economic loss, will be entitled to that option, as opposed to a more
formal malpractice claim for common law damages. Because the failure of the health care
provider to tender will signal the difficulty of proof of malpractice, and because, as with
a normal tort claim, claimant's counsel will be paid only if he wins, frivolous claims for
net economic loss will be discouraged. (Note also that a health care provider not making
a tender should not be required to notify the patient to that effect. Such notification would
entail an overly broad, cumbersome, bureaucratic burden under which a health care pro-
vider would be required to notify almost every patient of the lack of tender; rather, when
no tender is made, the burden should be on the patient to claim a compensable injury.)
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system are both the cause and effect of the present insufficient number
of settlements.
Defendants rarely make early offers as generous as that which would
be required by the proposal. They and their insurance company are locked
in the adversarial mode. Time is on the defendant's side, since it has the
use of any money it may ultimately have to pay. And the more needy
the plaintiff, the stronger the defendant's position and its incentive not
to make a settlement offer; the defendant knows it can outlast the claim-
ant who most needs a settlement. Defendants may also fear that making
such an offer will just encourage the claimant to believe that he can recover
even more if he perseveres through litigation. For this latter reason defen-
dants often fail to settle promptly for the claimant's net economic loss, even
when it might be thought advantageous for them to do so. 2
And when they do make a settlement offer, claimants or their lawyers
frequently reject it because they see it as a sign, as defendants fear they
will, that the case is worth much more. 3 So the lottery aspects of the
present system and the possibility of a very large recovery spur the plain-
tiff on. Nor, as just suggested, should the role of the plaintiffs' attorneys
be underestimated. Because they often are interested in the "big hit,"
they have an incentive to take the case to trial, risking the chance of
recovering nothing for the opportunity to strike it rich. They typically
have a number of contingent fee clients and thus are able to spread the
risk of recovering nothing over all of them. The plaintiff, on the other
hand, does not have this "portfolio diversification," and his ability to
recover is wrapped up in only one case-his own."
Our proposal is designed to increase greatly the number of cases that
are settled along the terms outlined, by providing incentives to providers
to make more generous and early settlement offers in a larger number
of cases in exchange for protection against paying damages for non-
economic loss.
EFFECT OF DETERRENCE
The proposal will be criticized on the ground that it removes the deter-
rent effect of damages for pain and suffering and of punitive damages.
Under this theory a potential tortfeasor is deterred from negligent behavior
by the possibility that he will be required to pay these extra, non-economic
damages.
We do not believe our proposed modifications to the tort system would
result in any undesirable changes in provider behavior. In the first place,
52. Id. at 604.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 604-05.
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the possibility of being liable in tort is still present. It is only by tender-
ing an injured patient's net economic loss-a not insufficient commitment
of itself-that a tort claim is foreclosed (and not in every case)." Sec-
ondly, the extent to which people avoid negligence because of the possibility
of tort damages is speculative at best." In addition, this criticism er-
roneously assumes that it is the defendant who pays the damages; in fact,
of course, it is insurance companies and ultimately other patients of all
hospitals or physicians who pay, in the form of increased fees to offset
increased premiums.
Professional pride, the opinion and review of one's peers, and the
fear of adverse publicity are all effective deterrents. None of those would
be eliminated by the proposal. With workers' compensation and automobile
no-fault laws, society abandoned substantial blocks of tort liability without
any apparent adverse effects on deterrence of negligent conduct." And
we do not propose for medical malpractice the elimination of tort, but
only the restriction of payment for non-economic damages. Indeed, we
recommend the expansion of the instances in which compensation for
economic loss would be paid, providing ample new incentives for pro-
viders not to be negligent. We believe, therefore, that the proposal will
not have any adverse effect on a provider's desire to provide quality care.
We also believe the proposal will reduce the extent to which defen-
55. Id. at 619.
56. Id. at 618.
Compensation law . . . seeks to achieve other meaningful objectives that are
not as elusive as deterrence. Among these objectives are administrative efficiency
and loss distribution. The proposed statutory scheme achieves administrative effi-
ciency because it reduces payments to lawyers, [insurance] adjusters, and other
third parties in the system; and it achieves loss distribution because it leaves fewer
accident victims and their families without resources. Compared to the goal of
deterrence, these two objectives are more readily attainable. It makes sense to
risk a remotely possible loss of deterrence to achieve the proposal's improvements
in loss distribution and administrative efficiency.
Id. at 620 (footnotes omitted). For a very searching indictment of the cumbersome tort
system, see Tullock, Welfare and Law, 2 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 151 (1982); Tullock,
Negligence Again, 1 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 51 (1981). Tullock bases his indictment on
(1) the tort system's very costly and often wasteful and manipulative adversary efforts at
proving or disproving fault, (2) its likely errors in determining same, and (3) its failure
to distribute losses. Tullock correspondingly emphasizes how much legal-economic analysis
fails to consider the beneficial-and even economically efficient-effects of no-fault or similar
payment schemes.
For further scholarly skepticism about the beneficial deterrent effects of tort rules, see
Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1982);
Pierce, Encouraging Sqfety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33 VAND.
L. REV. 1281 (1980).
57. U.S. Dep't of Transp., State No-Fault Automobile Insurance Experience 60 (1977).
But see Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical Investiga-
tion of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J. L. & EcoN. 49 (1982). For a reply to Landes,
see O'Connell & Levmore, A Reply to Landes: A Faulty Study of No-Fault's Effect on
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sive medicine is practiced and thus improve the quality of care and reduce
the costs of health care. As we have seen, physicians say that, because
of the increase in malpractice awards, they order more tests and provide
more treatment procedures than they otherwise would." To the extent
that the proposal would avoid fault-finding (as well as some of the ex-
tremely large verdicts-which are the ones which make the headlines in
the local community and to which the physicians naturally react), we
believe it would reduce the pressure on physicians to order tests and treat-
ment procedures for legal protection purposes only. By doing so it will
save patients money and the inconvenience and risk of unnecessary tests
(as well as the cost of same).
CONCLUSION
The fault-based tort system is not meeting societal goals as it is ap-
plied to medical malpractice claims. Only a small proportion of the vic-
tims of malpractice are recovering fair compensation for their losses, while
unusually large recoveries are conferred on a few others. Providers of health
care are faced with ever-increasing premiums for malpractice insurance
and are forced to engage in defensive medicine. Vast amounts of time
and money are expended in litigation to reach these unsatisfactory results.
We propose reforms, not to eliminate the fault-based system, but to
facilitate fair settlements for more people, more quickly reached, and more
promptly paid. The fault-based system would remain. No provider would
be required to make a settlement where it believed it was not at fault;
it could still defend against liability in court. But providers would be en-
couraged to make prompt settlements to avoid the lengthy litigation pro-
cess and to pay more victims fairly with the money that now is being
spent on, among other things, transaction costs.
We have embodied our proposal in "model" legislation for considera-
tion by the states, which are responsible for the operation :f the medical
malpractice system. To ensure that at least the beneficiaries of federal
assistance receive the benefits of the reform we suggest, it will be ap-
plicable to health care obtained by patients with federal assistance after
January 1, 1987, in any state which has not prior to that date reformed
its medical practice system across the board in line with the bill."
Fault?, 48 Mo. L. REV. 649 (1983). Cf. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 13.5 at 775-76 (1956).
58. Report, supra note 5, at 14; J. O'Connell, supra note 44, at 48-50.
59. We do not have much doubt that this proposal will pass constitutional muster.
No-fault automobile laws have generally done so, see, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass.
1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971), as did eventually their workers' compensation forerunners, see,
e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). For an extensive discussion
of the constitutionality of a proposal analogous to the one under discussion, including the
issue of federal supersession of state law, see O'Connell & Souk, Is It Constitutional?, in
J. O'Connell, supra note 44, at 204-45.
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